・2007.10.24  第6回「数理ファイナンスセミナー」のお知らせ

2007年度 第6回「数理ファイナンスセミナー」(名古屋市立大学経済学研究科 宮原研究室)のご案内をします.
関心のある方のご参加を歓迎いたします。

講師:西原 理 (大阪大学金融・保険教育研究センター特任助教)
タイトル: The Agency Problem between the
Owner and the Manager in Real Investment (with T. Shibata)
概要:In recent years, many real options literatures have investigated the strategic interaction among several firms from a game theoretic approach. While those studies focused on the competition with rival firms, Grenadier and Wang (2005) investigated the investment timing in a decentralized firm where the owner delegates the investment decision to the manager who has private information by combining the real options study and contract theory. However, their model considers only carrot, i.e., the bonus-incentive to the manager, as a measure for the owner to deal with the agency conflicts.
In this paper, we incorporate stick, i.e., an auditing technology, into their model. We show that the optimal contract is determined among the three feasible types, depending on the elation between the auditing cost and the penalty. The solution includes several results by the previous studies.

日時:2007年11月9日(金)午後3:00-4:30
場所:名古屋市立大学経済学部棟2階203教室(予定)
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(世話人:宮原孝夫 Tel:052-872-5718 E-mail:y-miya[at]econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp)

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